S ince the late 19
th century, international conferences have been of great concern to physicians and biomedical scientists. Certainly, adhering to the self-image of science and medicine as an international and indeed universal undertaking has been one central motivation for this interest. 1 Another, more pragmatic factor that fueled the interest was the possibility of meeting colleagues from abroad and getting news about recent developments in scientific, clinical, or institutional matters. A third aspect for the interest and investment in international meetings was their political function. As for example Susan Solomon or Nikolai Krementsov have pointed out for Russia and Germany in the interwar period, international scientiic conferences were an important instrument of foreign policy, as well as a platform for pursuing the politics of the related professions. 2 he International Congress of Child Psychiatry held in Paris in 1937 is an exemplary case to illustrate this political dimension. 3 In this article, the case of the German delegation is used to reconstruct the activities and contexts of the German actors at the Congress. Beyond that, this case is used as an opportunity to illustrate more general aspects. his example enables us to diferentiate two levels of politics inherent in the activities of psychiatrists at such a meeting, and also to shed some light on the intrinsic relationship between the psychiatric contents of the presentations at the congress, and the political dimension. 4 he intrinsic relationship between psychiatry and politics is, in a way, already embodied in the person of the leader of the German delegation to the Congress, the psychiatrist Ernst Rüdin psychiatry congress, but also of the German delegations to the two other conferences. 8 For the Congress of Child Psychiatry, Rüdin had a twofold political agenda: on the one hand, he acted beyond the medical and scientiic community in the broader framework of German foreign policy which aimed at the recognition and expansion of Germany's international reputation-after a period of isolation and loss of international impact following World War I. On the other hand, he sought to secure the core claims of the GDNP as a professional body. It was his aim to integrate the newly emerging ield of child and youth psychiatry irmly into the broader ield of psychiatry and neurology, counteracting tendencies of the new discipline's relevant actors to establish an independent professional association, or to ailiate themselves to the already existing associations of pediatricians, or medical pedagogues (Heilpädagogen).
9 Interestingly, although Rüdin was a high proile representative of psychiatric genetics and eugenics, and at other occasions vehemently acted in favor of imbuing psychiatry with the spirit of an eugenically inspired genetic approach, this aspect appears to have been clearly of lower priority compared to his political activities in the context of the Paris congress; this will be documented below.
he following is divided into three parts. First, the external politico-legal ramifications within which German physicians and scientists acted when attending professional conferences abroad are sketched. For the second part, the focus is on the three international congresses in Paris in general, since for Rüdin, this was the context in which he acted. he third part narrows the focus further on the Congress of Child Psychiatry. For the second and third part, Rüdin's report as leader of the German delegation to the state instances is analyzed, together with published accounts by himself and other participants of the conferences. Here, the view is directed to the following question: What are the entrenched political agendas on the level of foreign policy, as well as the politics of the professional bodies involved, and what is their weight in relation to Rüdin's more "scientiic" concerns to document the usefulness and importance of genetics in psychiatry?
POLITICAL AND LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
In the years before 1939, there were initially three state organs involved in the operations of coordinating German scientists' participation at professional Propaganda; RMVP) headed by Joseph Goebbels. hen there were secondary Nazi Party players such as the NS-Dozentenbund and the Rassenpolitisches Amt der NSDAP, but these served-at least in the pre-war years-primarily to exclude so-called "politically unreliable" scientists from representing Germany's interests abroad. here were, of course, conlicts of interest among the various state and party organs that viewed international conferences as falling under their administrative responsibility. In the area of concern here, there does not seem to have been any appreciable diference in the attitude of the major state organs toward international scientiic conferences, although Goebbels' ministry seems to have been most vocal in its demands on the scientists. he German Congress Center (Deutsche Kongress-Zentrale; DKZ) was established as a division of the Ministry for Propaganda in 1934. Beginning in 1936, all those seeking to attend an international conference needed the approval of the DKZ. From that time on, it was also responsible for questions of hard currency. hus, all applications made by individual scientists, or institutions in the name of their researchers, like the Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft, were dependent on this oice to get the needed hard currency to attend an international conference.
From the earliest days of the Third Reich, for Germans attending such meetings the following rules were obligatory: irst, they had to be organized as delegations with a "delegation leader" to speak for them; second, they were expected to meet with oicial German representatives in the foreign country where the conference was being held; and third, they were required to submit a report on their return home.
he DKZ made no secret about its view of the cultural-political importance of international conferences and its demands on delegation leaders at such meetings. As the DKZ's "Guidelines for Delegation Leaders" pointed out, a delegation leader had to understand that his task was not merely a professional one relevant to his special area of concern. Rather, he had to be able to view it as "political or cultural-propagandistic pioneer work in the sense of German world prestige […]". "Our present view of international congresses", the Guidelines continued, "difers decidedly from earlier, more traditional views".
11 Moreover, as the DKZ emphasized, "congresses are one of the most efective weapons in the struggle against poisoning the minds of people; in this manner we can, through eforts and personal impressions, eliminate prejudices and hateful lies without recourse to direct political propaganda".
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Complaining that about 75% of all international conferences were held in Paris or Brussels, the "Guidelines" argued that Germany should take its cue from France in recognizing the importance of such meetings as a conscious form of cultural propaganda that in "the hand of the statesman can be used as an unrivalled political weapon". 13 Declaring as one of its goals that Germany should play "a leading role, if not the leading role" at these international meetings, the delegation leader and the scientists under his leadership were urged to do all they could to bring this about. Among other things, this would include the delegation leader's skill to bring those under him as a "uniied group with one will". Moreover, the "Guidelines" stated, special attention must also be given to questions at conferences touching such politically sensitive issues as "racial hygiene, sterilization, [and the] Jewish problem […]". Delegation leaders were instructed to answer these questions in an objective manner and directly rebuke any attempt at a critique of Nazi racial policies. And inally, the delegation leaders had to recognize that the decision about who was to speak at such conferences was not up to the congress organizers, but was a matter of the involved German institutions: "we decide who may represent Germany abroad". 14 Under a section of the Guidelines entitled "It must not happen that …", the DKZ clearly articulated several taboos for international conferences: irst, a German scientist should never contradict another in matters of Nazi ideology; second, if a German speaker was attacked, some members of the delegation should not leave the room while others do not; third, no German speaker should be made to look ridiculous by other members of the delegation; fourth, no member of the delegation should feel insulted that he was not selected as delegation leader; the decision is not a professional value judgment but is based on several criteria, including his personal relationships to foreign scholars. Members of the German delegation, who are found to be a political liability at a conference, despite having passed the political litmus test for attending such conferences, will be sent home immediately. he reports submitted for example by Ernst Rüdin, or the geneticists Eugen Fischer and Otmar von Verschuer to the relevant state agencies suggest that these and similar guidelines were closely observed-indeed, they were followed well before 1938, the year the DKZ issued the above-quoted Guidelines. It may be assumed that the content of the reports were fairly accurate as important members of the Nazi Party, such as
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EUGENICS, RACE, AND PSYCHIATRY AT THREE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES IN PARIS 1937
Of all three international conferences in Paris held in 1937, the German delegation with Rüdin at its top expected a conlict with foreign physicians and medical geneticists on issues of eugenics and race. Rüdin tried to anticipate the developments and prepare counter-strategies. To his close colleague Hans Roemer, member of the Board of the GDNP, he had already at an earlier stage of the preparations written that everybody [of the delegates] should take care that "we do not only represent the interests of pure science, but also the interests of the Reich, and do propaganda with the aim to prevent distorted views and judgments abroad on the Reich and the Party". 16 he conlicts developed indeed: at the Mental Hygiene conference, Rüdin's presentation about the German sterilization law 17 was countered by a critical presentation of the French psychiatrist of Polish-Jewish origin, Françoise Minkowska-Brokman. heir controversy caused a lively debate in which also the Swiss psychiatrist Hans W. Maier, from Zurich, criticized the German law due to basic problems of the diagnosis for those conditions listed in it. 18 In his report to the RMWE, Rüdin wrote that his presentation had, as expected, caused "strong contradiction in a lively, but polite discussion". Landry, to prevent it. Landry had called for a preview of the invited speeches which, however, was directed primarily against those who were criticizing the German version of "hereditary health policies". Nevertheless, the open critique during the meeting could not be blocked. A group of French scientists around Henri Laugier and Paul Rivet, as well as the famous American anthropologist of German-Jewish origin Franz Boas, and Ignaz Zollschan from Prague questioned the importance of genetics as the determining factor in such traits as intelligence, and denied that a country's intellectual development was dependent upon the race of its inhabitants. Moreover, Boas and his likeminded colleagues argued that the individual's or group's environment largely shaped so-called racial traits. 20 In their reports of this conference, both Rüdin and the geneticist Verschuer emphasized how Rüdin as the delegation leader had stressed the scientiic contributions of his own Institute's members in combating the "'Jewish' point of view". 21 Rüdin further stated that at the conference, "the German position was defended in a worthy manner and undoubtedly won an intellectual and moral victory". Commenting on the three conferences in general, he claimed that the tenor had been rather sympathetic towards the German views, in contrast to previous international congresses, as for example that of the International Federation of Eugenic Organizations in Scheveningen, 1936. Now, in Paris, it had been possible to correct some "erroneous ideas about Germany's eugenic health policy". 22 Rüdin inally argued that it was necessary to go to such 
THE GERMAN DELEGATES AT THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS FOR CHILD PSYCHIATRY
For the Congress of Child Psychiatry in particular, Rüdin gave a detailed account in the report to the DKZ. According to him, the conference had been attended by 350 participants from 49 countries. Rüdin reported that during the opening session, he had been asked to act as the speaker of all foreign delegations.
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Amongst the participants, there had been 12 oicial German delegates. Two of them had been pediatricians: Albrecht Peiper (Wuppertal) and Jussuf Ibrahim (Jena), the remaining ten had been psychiatrists, including the already mentioned psychiatrist Alfred (Fred) Dubitscher who represented the Reich Health Oice (Reichsgesundheitsamt). he delegates had been chosen after suggestions by the psychiatric as well as the pediatric association, approval by Rüdin, and a political evaluation by the DKZ, as well as a inal approval of the RMWE.
he oicial languages of the Congress were French, English, and German, with simultaneous translation-a technical modality which Rüdin commented on very positively. 24 he irst day of the Congress was devoted to the importance of conditioned relexes (described by Pavlov) for child and youth psychiatry; the second day focused on educational methods for disorders of character and intelligence; the third day focused on youth criminality. 25 Four of the German delegates had also been invited as speakers. A ifth one, Werner Villinger, in the post-World War II period to become the irst president of the German Society of Child and Youth psychiatry, was also listed on the program, however, due to illness, he did not attend the conference.
26 he two pediatricians gave presentations on the second day on the importance of conditional relexes for psychiatry and for functional somatic disorders (that is, for disorders without a morphological correlate 27 ). It is interesting to note that both accepted the relex-concept of the Soviet neurophysiologist Pavlov without qualiications, and on the other hand did in no way refer to hereditary aspects regarding the conditions they talked about. Heinrich Többen addressed "he 23. rüdin Ernst, "Bericht…", op. cit., p. 5.; see also the oficial speech in this func- Pre-criminal life [of delinquent youths] and the problem of custody". 28 He postulated that research in "pre-criminal life" was more or less identical with that in moral neglect, and-without reference to any empirical research-that regarding the causation of such neglect, heredity was a stronger factor than environment. He argued that custody was an adequate measure to prevent neglected children and youths to drift into criminality.
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Paul Schröder, professor of psychiatry at Leipzig University and one of the leading personalities in the ield of child and youth psychiatry, gave a talk on "Educative methods applied to problems of intelligence and character". 30 According to him, disorders of intelligence were those which might be differentiated by quantity, whereas within the group of disorders of character, there were qualitative differences. Those individuals with abnormalities of the character, however, were difering from normal individuals only by degree, not in a qualitative manner. He recommended to look both at adverse environmental conditions and at somatic disorders as explanatory factors, and suggested intensive educational measures and individualized pedagogical treatment schemes. Schröder's lecture, too, is quite remarkable because of the absence of any reference to genetic factors in the causation, and to eugenic measures for the prevention of such conditions.
In the emerging institutionalization of child and youth psychiatry, Paul Schröder, although a prominent psychiatrist represented in the Board of the GDNP, was an independent actor who played out various options for a professional organization of the new ield. 31 To understand the situation in 1937, a few remarks about the broader ield may be in place. Already in the immediate aftermath of the Nazi takeover in 1933, the previously existing Society for Curative Pedagogics (Gesellschaft für Heilpädagogik) ceased, and another professional grouping, the German Association for the Care of Juvenile Psychopaths (Deutscher Verein für jugendliche Psychopathen) was closed downwith Rüdin's active involvement. 32 Already at that time, Rüdin and his closest colleagues had intended to reduce the number and activities of organizations working in the broad ield of psychiatry and mental health care, as he and his immediate surroundings understood it, and to unite all the related activities under the umbrella of one overarching professional association. 33 However, in pursuing this goal, a problem emerged in the discussions of the Board of the GDNP which was relevant in particular for the ield of child and youth psychiatry, as well as for that of psychotherapy: What to do with members of the previously existing, or rival organizations who were no physicians, but psychologists, pedagogues, or teachers in schools for mentally handicapped children-and who had thus ailiations to other professional groups? 34 Schröder used this situation to ask for special rules for a section within the GDNP-as Rüdin wanted to see it-or another kind of grouping for child and youth psychiatry within the overarching organization, or associated with it. Rüdin, in turn, courted him and attempted to integrate Schröder's activities under the umbrella of the GDNP. his resulted for Schröder in a considerable scope of action and talk, in a way deviating from Rüdin's strong and otherwise insisting focus on eugenics and the genetics of psychiatric and behavioral disorders.
his historical coniguration, and the strong conlicts Rüdin had to deal with at the two parallel Paris conferences may explain the fact that in the presentations of the four German delegates at the Congress of Child Psychiatry, the otherwise to be expected clear and positive references to eugenics and the importance of the German sterilization law were absent. Schröder even stressed the impact of environmental factors on juvenile deviant behavior, and the need for intensifying educational measures. Further research is needed to reconstruct the negotiations within the German delegation, and between it and the international community of the emerging professional ield which led to the appointment of Schröder to the oice of president of the International Committee for Child Psychiatry during the Congress. his oice was linked to the function of main organizer of the envisaged Second International Congress for Child Psychiatry which-as the delegates unanimously decided-was to be held in 1941 in Leipzig.
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EPILOGUE
Rüdin's "appeasement" policy towards Schröder and the emerging network of child and youth psychiatrists had some preliminary, but not lasting success. At the next board meeting of the GDNP in September 1938, it was agreed that there should be a congress of child psychiatry in Leipzig in 1940, with Rüdin as president and Schröder as managing director. hus, for the time being, Schröder did not follow up on his previous option of an independent organization, but rather pursued the establishment of a semi-independent association under the umbrella of the GDNP. In March 1939, at the next meeting of the International Committee for Child Psychiatry, held during the annual conference of the GDNP in Wiesbaden, Schröder took the next step and launched the German Working Association of Child Psychiatry (Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Kinderpsychiatrie) , with himself as chair. he aim of this association was to prepare the establishment of a professional organization of child psychiatrists in coordination with the GDNP.
However, with the beginning of the war in September 1939, changes occurred on two levels: within the board of the GDNP, a new hierarchy of priorities emerged on the agenda, with the organizational response to challenges of war (high numbers of brain injuries; need for hospital capacities) and the related program of patient killings (euthanasia) to re-allocate the limited resources. he close attention to attendance and monitoring of Schröder's activities moved to the background. On the level of political institutions, the Reich Health Oice took the initiative to unite all medical and related professional activities concerning children and youths, with a first major event termed Child Studies Week (Kinderkundliche Woche) held in in Vienna in September 1940. 36 his included interlinked conferences of the German Association of Pediatrics (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kinderheilkunde), the German General Association of Psychotherapy (Deutsche Allgemeine Gesellschaft für Psychotherapie), and the Working Association of Child Psychiatry. In the preparations for this event, Schröder explored the leeway which he realized he had gained from the momentum of the newly emerging ield. Without any co-ordination with Rüdin, he prepared the oicial foundation of the new German Association of Child Psychiatry and Curative Pedagogy (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kinderpsychiatrie und Heilpädagogik) on this occasion. During a business meeting of the Working Association, but in absence of Rüdin or any other board member of the GDNP, Schröder proclaimed the establishment of the new professional organization. he audience of the conference was declared to be the founding assembly of the association, with Schröder as its president. No mention was made of the speciic relation to the GDNP. 37 hus, in efect, in view of the emerging ield of child psychiatry and its protagonists during the Paris congress, Rüdin's tactical maneuvering had only limited success, and in the longer term, the leeway gained in Paris was used by Schröder to realize his plans of an independent association. However, his success was also not a lasting one: due to the increasing international isolation of the German scientiic community and other war related dynamics, the second international congress for child psychiatry, originally (at the Paris conference) planned to take place in Leipzig in 1941, did not materialize. Schröder himself died suddenly from an infection in June 1941. his discontinuity on the level of top management, combined with the conditions of war prevented further meetings and a irm establishment of the new association. In fact, the broader arena of institutionalized psychiatry in general underwent a major crisis during the later years of the war and the immediate post-war period, not unrelated to the systematic killings of psychiatric patients and handicapped children in which protagonists of both the GDNP and the emerging ield of child and youth psychiatry were involved. he association of child psychiatry ceased to exist by date, and a new foundation of an organization in this ield only occurred in 1950. 
